NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW
Volume 11

Number 2

Article 7

Spring 1986

Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or Emerging Policy
North Carolina Journal of International Law and Commercial Regulation

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the International Law Commons

Recommended Citation
North Carolina Journal o. and Commercial Regulation, Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or
Emerging Policy, 11 N.C. J. INT'L L. 293 (1986).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncilj/vol11/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Carolina Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

Grey Market Imports: Burgeoning Crisis or
Emerging Policy
John Triplett Mackintosh*
with Editorial Contributions by Thomas R. Graham**
I. Introduction
Grey market imports have received varying and often contradictory treatment from U.S. courts, the U.S. International Trade Commission ("ITC" or "Commission"), and the executive branch.' The
trade and economic problems presented by these imports have so
affected U.S. industry that Congress officially urged the Reagan Administration to present a grey market policy statement by the end of
1985.2 Although the Administration appointed an inter-agency
working group 3 to formulate a comprehensive policy, the group only
succeeded in underscoring the difficulty of the issues involved. The
working group produced six different policy options, but was unable
to recommend any single alternative to the Administration. 4 Judicial
and administrative fora have been equally unsuccessful in providing
* Associate, Debevoise and Plimpton, Washington, D.C. Clerk for Judge Duvall at
the International Trade Commission during the Duracell litigation; B.A. Regis College;
M.A. Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver; J.D. 1986, Georgetown University Law Center. The views expressed by the author do not necessarily
reflect the views ofJudge Duvall or the International Trade Commission.
** Partner, Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom, Washington, D.C. Member of
the bar of the District of Columbia. The views expressed herein are solely those of the
authors and should not be attributed to the International Trade Commission.
I See infra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
2 S. REP. No. 133, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1985). In May 1984, the Working Group
on Intellectual Property of the Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade solicited information on grey market goods and their effect on U.S. industry. See 49 Fed. Reg. 21,453
(1984). Extended response time was announced in 49 Fed. Reg. 29,509 (1984). Over
1,000 responses were received. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, April 26, 1985, Annex. The responses
indicate that grey market imports are a growing problem for many U.S. industries.
" The working group was composed of officials from the Office of Management and
Budget, Council of Economic Advisors, U.S. Trade Representatives Office, Justice Department. and the Departments of Commerce, State, and Treasury. INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra
note 2.
4 The following options were presented to the Cabinet Council on Commerce and
Trade:
i. Maintain the present policy of allowing grey market imports where the
foreign and U.S. trademark owners are related and the foreign articles bear a
recorded trademark authorized by a U.S. owner.
ii. Allow grey market imports, but impose mandatory labeling to inform
consumers that grey goods are neither authorized nor warranted by the U.S.
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guidance for the development of a national grey market import policy because of the ambiguities in U.S. trademark and trade laws.
This article provides an introduction to the fundamental legal
and policy issues that have produced these ambiguities and examines
the roles that common law, as well as, statutory and administrative
developments have played in the current debate. Because a viable
grey market policy remains elusive, this article highlights the major
areas of the controversy and problems confronting policy-makers.
The varying nature of grey market imports contributes to the
difficulty of forming a grey market policy. Although grey market imports may be broadly defined as unauthorized imports bearing U.S.
registered trademarks, they arise in a number of distinct commercial
relationships. For example, a U.S. trademark owner, who manufactures his trademarked goods in the United States may license a foreign manufacturer or establish a foreign subsidiary to produce and
sell goods under his trademark. This arrangement may specify that
the foreign-made trademarked goods are to be sold exclusively
abroad. If these goods are subsequently imported into the United
States, they are grey market goods because the U.S. trademark
owner did not authorize their importation. In this example, unauthorized imports compete with domestically produced goods; however, both bear identical trademarks. 5
A second category of grey market imports, parallel imports, involves unauthorized imports that compete with unauthorized imports. This occurs when a U.S. trademark holder owns the
trademark and exclusive importation rights to a foreign-made trademarked good. If a third party imports the same foreign-made trademarked items, that party circumvents the exclusive license held by
the U.S. trademark owner, and the imports are part of the grey market.6 A third group of grey market imports encompasses trademarked goods manufactured in the United States for export. These
trademark owner, and are not subject to the same warranty and service benefits as U.S. goods.
iii. Amend § 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982)) to
make it easier to challenge grey market imports before the U.S. International
Trade Commission.
iv. Continue to allow the entry of grey market imports that are identical to
their domestic counterparts.
v.

Allow the entry of grey market imports only if the infringing trademark is

removed or obliterated.
vi. Prohibit grey market imports without the written consent of the U.S.
trademark owner.
See INSIDE U.S. TRADE, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., Certain Alkaline Batteries, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 823, (Int'l Trade Comm'n
1984), disapproved by President Reagan pursuant to 19 U.SC. § 1337(g) (1982), 50 Fed. Reg.

1655, reprinted in 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 862, appeal dinissied sub foa., Duracell, Inc. v. United
States Int'l Trade Comm'n, 778 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Duracell.
(i See,e.g., Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 420 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984),
aj.d, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 791 (1986).

1986]

GREY IMPORTS: CRISIS OR POLICY

295

goods may become grey market items if, once exported, they are imported into the United States without authorization of the U.S. trade7
mark holder.
While their form may change, all grey market goods share certain characteristics. Grey market goods can injure U.S. industries because they often are sold in the United States at a substantially lower
price than the goods against which they compete. These cheaper imports, bearing trademarks identical to the authorized product, can
capture a large portion of a market in a relatively short time. As a
result, grey market goods can adversely affect domestic producers
and industries that are dependent on U.S. manufacturing, as well as
other American property interests.
Because grey market disputes frequently involve well known
trademarks 8 held by large companies, vast amounts of capital and
numerous domestic jobs could be lost to foreign manufacturers of
grey market goods. In addition, international investment may decrease. U.S. firms might be less likely to expand internationally if
goods they manufacture overseas may return to compete against
them in the U.S. market.
The law governing grey market imports is inconsistent and in
transition. The Lanham Act 9 and section 526 of the Tariff Act of
193010 provide statutory protections against trademark infringement. Although section 526 prohibits the unauthorized importation
of goods bearing a U.S. trademark,"I the effect of this statute on grey
market imports has been circumscribed by Customs Regulation Section 133.21 (c)(1)-(3). This regulation provides an exception permitting unauthorized trademarked goods to enter the United States
when the U.S. trademark Owner and the foreign source of the goods
are related companies or part of the same company.1 2 The validity
of this Customs' exception in relation to section 526 is at the heart of
the legal debate over grey market imports.' 3
The fact that law and policy pertaining to grey market imports
are simultaneously under review in three different fora exacerbates
this trade problem. Some courts have given relief to U.S.
trademarket holders, 14 while others have allowed the grey market
7 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 824 n.2.
8 Neuner, 120 N.Y.L.J. 1.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124 (1982). The Lanham Act provides civil remedies for
trademark infringement.
10 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982).
See id.
12 See 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(1)-(3) (1985).

S-' See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
14 See A. Bouriois & Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923) (per crian); A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel, 260 U.S. 689 (1923); Selchow & Righter Co. v. Goldex Corp., 612 F. Supp.

19 (S.D. Fla. 1985); iqnfra notes 28-41, 46-61, 64-80 and accompanying text.
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imports to continue.' 5 The International Trade Commission excluded grey market goods in one case, only to have the President
veto the Commission's action and admit the imports.' 6 Furthermore, the executive branch has not been consistent in its approach.
Judicial and administrative determinations have recently documented the Customs Bureau's inconsistency in dealing with this
issue. 17
The complexity of the policy issues involved further complicates
matters. The current public policy debate must embrace such diverse issues as U.S. obligations under international trade agreements, domestic economic policy, the activities of multinational
enterprises (MNE) and antitrust considerations, and the role of intellectual property rights in international trade.
The questions posed by grey market goods include a wide range
of both legal and policy problems. In order to understand how these
problems evolved, it is necessary to examine trademark law and its
relationship to international trade.
II. The Common Law Territoriality Doctrine
U.S. trademark protection and international trade have had an
uneasy relationship. While U.S. trademark owners have lobbied for
laws to protect domestic trademarks by excluding unauthorized imports, importers of trademarked items have insisted that a free flow
of goods is vital to international trade and that trademark rights
should not create trade barriers. The tension produced by these
competing interests is reflected in U.S. common law and its application to statutory provisions. To understand the common law development in this area and its response to the grey market problem, the
unique characteristics of trademarks must be more fully explored.
Trademarks, like patents and copyrights, are limited monopolies. However, unlike patent or copyright monopoly rights which are
created by statute, the right to a trademark comes from prior appropriation and use in trade. As a result, although statutes may broaden
common law trademark rights, these rights are determined largely by
judicial interpretation.'" Therefore, common law trademark protection has significantly influenced the application of statutory trademark provisions.
I5 See I'ivitar, 761 F.2d at 569-70; Monte Carlo Shirt Co. Inc. v. Daewoo Int'l Am.
Corp., 707 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1983); Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of Am. Trademarks v. United States, 598 F. Supp. 844 (D.D.C. 1984), rev d, 790 F.2d 903 (D.C. Cir.
1986); infra notes 21-27, and accompanying text.
16 See Duracell 225 U.S.P.Q. at 823; Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
17 See Vivilar, 761 F.2d at 1568; Initial Determination ofJudge Duvall in Duracell, Inv.
No. 337-TA-165 (Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
18 4A

R.CAI.LMANN,

rIE

i.Es § 25.03 (4th ed. 1983).

LAW OF UNFAIR COMPEIrrION,

TRADEMARKS,

AND MONOPO-
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The scope of protection offered by a trademark differs from patents or copyrights. A trademark is "only indicative of rights acquired
by use and provides for procedural benefits, not monopoly rights as
in a grant of a patent."1 9 Trademarks are also intrinsically tied to the
business they represent. They are objective symbols of the goodwill
20
established by the trademark owner.
A.

The Universality and Territoriality Principles: Early Judicial
Treatment of Grey Market Imports

For U.S. courts, the primary difficulty with grey market imports
arises from imported goods that are genuine. Genuine goods bear
the actual trademark, not a copied or simulated trademark. Leading
cases in this area demonstrate the problems courts have had in dealing with genuine goods and allegations of trademark infringement.
Appollinaris Co. v. Scherer 2' illustrates both the dilemma faced by
the courts and the degree to which common law has almost reversed
itself in this field. This case arose when an English company that
owned the U.S. trademark and exclusive U.S. import rights of imported Hungarian mineral water discovered that another company
was importing the mineral water into the United States. The British
plaintiff sued under U.S. trademark laws to stop the imports. The
Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York (later to become
the Second Circuit) concluded that the other importer could import
the water under the same trademark. 2 2 The court reasoned that
trademark protection could not be invoked in this case because the
imported water was genuine, not a copy or counterfeit. 23 The court
held that because a trademark protects the public by "vouch[ing] for
the genuineness of the thing" trademark law offers no relief unless a
24
trademark were being used to falsely denote the origin of a good.
The court also held that the U.S. trademark owner neither had nor
could have obtained "a territorial title" to the imported item because
trademark rights, unlike patent grants, may not be subdivided into
legally cognizable territorial divisions.25
The court's analysis demonstrates the universality principle
which states that a trademark is valid if it correctly identifies the ori19 Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. A.J. Indus. Corp., 165 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 668
(T.M.T.A.B. 1970); see also United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97-98
(1918) (trademark does not confer monopoly in proper sense but protects goodwill by
distinguishing one manufacturer's goods from another's).
20 See American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 (1926); Hanover Star
Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916); 1J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 2:7 (2d ed. 1984).

21 27 F. 18 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1886).
22 See id. at 20.
23 See id.
24 Id. at 21.
25 Id.
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gin of the good to which it is attached, regardless of where the good
is sold. In this manner, the universality doctrine gives extraterritorial effect to foreign trademarks that correctly denote the origin of
the goods.
Approximately thirty years later, the Second Circuit reiterated
the universality principle in another genuine goods dispute, Fred
Gretsch ManufacturingCo. v. Schoening. 26 Schoening differed from Appollinaris because Congress had enacted a new trademark law in 1905
which prohibited
the importation of copies or simulations of U.S.
27
trademarks.
In Schoening an owner of a U.S. trademark for a foreign-made
good unsuccessfully attempted to assert exclusive trademark rights,
thereby preventing another importer from bringing the goods into
the United States. The court held that applying the statute did not
change the rule in Appollinaris. The court reasoned that the statute
did not reach genuine items and under the universality approach
genuine goods were not copies or simulations that could infringe
U.S. trademarks. Therefore, the court permitted the unauthorized
28
genuine goods to enter the United States.
The universality approach adopted in Appollinaris and Schoening
frustrated the expectations of U.S. companies holding exclusive
trademark rights, and proved to be short lived. Perhaps protectionist sentiment, or a new sense of fairness, pervaded judicial thinking
and caused the change. Whatever the underlying motive, the
Supreme Court repudiated the universality principle in A. Bourjois &
Co. v. Katzel. 29 This case involved a U.S. company that bought the
right to the U.S. trademark of a French firm from the French company. 30 That company subsequently claimed exclusive U.S. import
rights and distributed the French product in the U.S. market. 3 1
Later, a second importer purchased goods bearing the French trademark registered to the original U.S. importer from the French manufacturer, and imported them into the United States. The U.S.
company alleged that the genuine items infringed its trademark and
32
sought an injunction to restrain the infringement.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York found
that the U.S. owner of the U.S. trademark had developed a U.S. market and a concommitant goodwill for the French goods. 3 3 The trade26
27
28
29

238 F. 780 (2d Cir. 1916).
Trademark Act of 1905, ch. 592, § 27, 33 Stat. 730 (1905).
See Schoening, 238 F. at 780-82.
260 U.S. 689 (1923).
30 See id. at 690.
31 See id. at 690-91. The same arrangement was at issue in Schoening, 238 F. at 780-81,
and Appollinaris, 27 F. at 19-20.
32 See Katzel, 260 U.S. at 691.
33 See id., 274 F. 856, 857 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), rev'd, 275 F. 539 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260
U.S. 689 (1928).
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mark owner thus had established a domestic goodwill in the French
product that was conceptually separate from the French goods manufactured in France and distributed elsewhere in the world.3 4 Asserting the territoriality principle, the court reasoned that a
trademark "is genuine as a matter of law only if defendent [the other
importer] has the right to sell where plaintiff [the U.S. trademark
owner] is the exclusive owner of the trademark."' 35 The court
granted a preliminary injunction because the U.S. trademark owner
had purchased rights to the U.S. trademark from the foreign firm
and expended a great deal of money in developing goodwill for the
trademark in the U.S. market.3 6 In addition, the court reasoned that
a contrary finding could have a negative impact on other similarly
situated business interests by allowing a foreign firm to sell its U.S.
trademark rights to a U.S. concern and subsequently compete with
37
that company under the same trademark.
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed. Reiterating its Appollinaris and Schoening reasoning, the court held that the goods imported by the second importer did not infringe the domestic
trademark because the goods were genuine goods covered by the
trademark. "Genuine," as interpreted by the court, meant that the
goods originated from the same manufacturer.3 8 According to the
universality principle's logic, there could be no infringement in a
case involving a genuine good because such good by definition cannot be a copy or a simulation, nor can it cause confision to consumers about the source of the good.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's analysis. Affirming the territoriality principle's validity, the Court reasoned that
the second importer's ownership of the goods did not give it the
right to sell them under a specific trademark.3 9 Two major points
were emphasized by the Court. First, the U.S. trademark was plaintiff's exclusive trademark 40 because the U.S. company had purchased
exclusive trademark rights from the French firm. 4 1 Second, because
34 274 F. at 857-59.
35 Id. at 859-60 (emphasis added).
36 See id. at 859 (citing Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 403).
37 See id. at 859. Katzel was not brought under the trademark provisions of the 1905

Act, which was applied in Schoening. Instead, Katzel turned on the rights of private parties
to determine, as a matter of law, the validity of a given trademark. The court found that
the domestic company's U.S. trademark was valid, and that the identical trademark that the
French firm applied to genuine goods was invalid in the United States. Id. at 860.
38 See id., 275 F. 539, 543 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 260 U.S. 689 (1923). The court contrasted the territorial protections offered by patents with the different protections given by
trademarks. Trademarks denote the origin of the goods and cannot be used to limit the
sale of genuine goods. Id., 275 F. at 543. By implication, trademarks do not provide territorial protection.

39 See id., 260 U.S. at 692.
40 See id. at 691-92.
41 See id. at 690.
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the U.S. public perceived the goods as originating from the plaintiff,
the French goods were sold in the United States by virtue of the
goodwill the plaintiff created, and the trademark "stake[d] the reputation of the plaintiff upon the character of the goods." 4 2 Therefore,
the Court sustained the preliminary injunction against trademark
43
infringement.
Under Katzel, the territoriality principle provides that, because a
trademark is the creation of each country's laws, no nation's trademark laws can be applied extraterritorially to create "universal" or
"global" trademarks. 4 4 The territoriality concept clearly applies
when genuine articles are imported into a nation where another
party owns the exclusive trademark rights to that foreign product.
However, the scope of this protection and its applicability to U.S.
trade law is uncertain. Under Katzel trademarked goods may be excluded from importation if the U.S. trademark owner has purchased
exclusive rights to the trademark from the foreign manufacturer, is
independent from the foreign manufacturer, and has developed its
45
own goodwill in the U.S. market.
A U.S. district court has stated that Katzel is limited to the following narrow range of facts: "[when] an American purchaser of domestic trademark rights [is] totally independent from the foreign
manufacturer and bec[o]me[s] the complete master of the trademark
in the United States for the reason that the public recognized the
American purchaser as the sole source of goods in the United
States." '4 6 It is, therefore, difficult to apply the Katzel principle to
broader fact patterns. For example, its application is unclear in disputes involving MNE which may own both the U.S. and foreign
trademark rights, authorize manufacture abroad, and then attempt to
keep the foreign made goods out of the U.S. market. 47 The difficulty
of applying Katzel is reflected in current applications of the law to
grey market imports.
B.

Current Applications of the Law to Grey Market Imports

Two recent federal cases, Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Sup42 Id. at 692.

43 See id. Subsequently, the Court reaffirmed the territoriality principle in A. Bourjois
& Co. v. Aldridge, 263 U.S. 675 (1923), a per curiam decision involving facts nearly identical
to those in Katzel. Katzel, however, dealt with trademark validity while the issue in Aldidge
was whether the U.S. trademark holder could prevent the importation of genuine goods
into the United States. The Court held that goods found to be infringing under the Katzel
standard could be excluded from the U.S. market.
44 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
45 This result underscores a fundamental purpose of a trademark, which is to symbolize the local goodwill created by the local business. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 827.
46 Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
47 See id. at 851.
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ply Co. 4 8 and Osawa & Co. v. B & H Photo 49 demonstrate how the
territoriality principle has been applied to facts similar to Katzel.
Both cases, like Katzel, involved a U.S. trademark owner employing
the territoriality principle in claiming that even genuine goods can
50
infringe a U.S. trademark.
In Bell & Howell plaintiff sought to enjoin another enterprise
from importing genuine "Mamiya" cameras into the United States,
claiming infringement of its exclusive trademark and distribution
right to "Mamiya" products. 5' The District Court for the Eastern
District of New York granted a preliminary injunction after applying
the territoriality principle. 52 The court held that plaintiff had established goodwill for Mamiya goods in the U.S. market and that there
was a substantial likelihood of consumer confusion between the au53
thorized and grey market cameras.
The Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction, holding
that the lower court had abused its discretion. 54 Because the court
determined that plaintiff failed to sustain its burden of proving irrep55
arable injury, it did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claim.
In Osawa this same plaintiff, under new ownership, filed suit in
the District Court for the Southern District of New York, claiming
that the grey market "Mamiya" imports infringed its exclusive trademark and caused irreparable injury. 5 6 The Osawa court found that
plaintiff had developed separate goodwill for the "Mamiya" goods in
the United States and granted a preliminary injunction, citing Katzel
as demonstrating plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits of its
57
trademark claim.
The court refuted the universality doctrine, noting that it fails to
reflect that trademark rights are not founded on the notion of a
transnational marketplace 58 with an international rubric of trademark issuance and protection. Because the universality doctrine incorrectly gave trademarks a legal force outside their country of
48 548 F. Supp. 1063 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated and remanded, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir.
1983).
49 589 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).

50 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1066; Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1171.
51 See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1064-65. In a twist of the Katzel facts, Bell &
Howell owned 50% of the Japanese manufacturer of Mamiya cameras. See id. at 1069.
Plaintiff invoked both the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1124 (1982), which provides
civil remedies for trademark infringement, and the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 526
(1982), which appears to supplement the Lanham Act. See infra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
52 See Bell & Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1063.

53 See
54 See
55 See
56 See
57 See
trademark

id. at 1079.
id., 719 F.2d at 46.
id. at 45-46.
Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1165.
id. at 1171. Preliminary relief was granted under § 526 of the Tariff Act and for
infringement. See id.

58 See id. at 1172.
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origin, the court concluded it had to be discarded. 59 In applying the
territoriality principle, the court noted that the Supreme Court has
endorsed the concept of territoriality of trademark rights in decisions other than Katzel. 60 The court also cited international agreements supporting the territoriality principle, including the Paris
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 6 ' and the General Inter-American Convention for Trademark and Commercial
Protection 62 and held that a trademark may have a separate legal basis, as well as a different commercial significance, in each country
63
depending on the goodwill developed in the specific nation.
Although the above cases narrowly applied the territoriality
principle to specific statutory provisions aimed at infringing imports,
they did not address the apparent conflict between section 526 of the
Tariff Act and Customs Regulation 133.21. Section 526 of the Tariff
Act prohibits importation of goods bearing a U.S. trademark without
the trademark owner's consent. 64 In contrast to this statute's language, Customs Regulation section 133.21 prevents U.S. trademark
holders from excluding unauthorized imports bearing U.S. registered marks if the goods emanate from a related company. 65 In
Vivitar Corp. v. United States the Court of International Trade (CIT)
and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) examined
59 See id. at 1175.
60 For example, this concept has been endorsed in cases which base territoriality on
the sovereignty of nations. Id. at 1172 (citing Ingenohl v. Walter E. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S.
541, 544 (1927). The Court found support in the doctrine that trademark rights arise
from using a mark in a "particular geographic market" rather than a global one. See id.; see
also United Drug, 248 U.S. at 98; Hanover Star Milling, 240 U.S. at 415-16.
61 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21
U.S.T. 1629, T.I.A.S. No. 6923. Article 6(3) provides: "A mark duly registered in a country of the Union shall be regarded as independent of marks registered in the other countries of the Union, including the country of origin." Id.
62 General Inter-American Convention for Trade Mark and Commercial Protection,
Feb. 20, 1929, 46 Stat. 2907, T.S. No. 833, art. 11; see Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 828.
63 See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1173. The court found further support in a 1962
amendment to § 32 of the Lanham Act, which repealed the requirement that a plaintiff
show confusion as to "source of origin" of the goods. See id. at 1173.
64 Section 526 provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise of
foreign manufacture if such merchandise . .. bears a trademark owned by a
citizen of, or by a corporation or association created or organized within, the
United States . . . unless written consent of the owner of such trademark is
produced at the time of making entry.
19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982).
65 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(a), (c)(1)-(3) provides:
a) Articles of foreign or domestic manufacture bearing a mark or name or
simulating a recorded trademark or trade name shall be denied entry . . . (c)

The restrictions set forth in paragraph (a) . . . do not apply to

imported articles when: (1) Both the foreign and the U.S. trademark or trade
name are owned by the same person or business entity; (2) The foreign and
domestic trademark or trade name owners are parent and subsidiary companies or are otherwise subject to common control . . . ; (3) The articles of
foreign manufacture bear a recorded trademark or trade name applied under
authorization of the U.S. owner.
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the apparent conflict between the plain language of section 526 and
the Customs Regulation. 66 In this case, a corporate owner of the
U.S. VIVITAR trademark sought a declaratory judgment that the
U.S. Customs Service must exclude all unauthorized imports of VIVITAR trademarked goods. Wholly-owned subsidiaries of plaintiff
were marketing VIVITAR goods overseas, but were not licensed to
sell the goods in the United States. 6 7 Controversy arose when a
third party, unrelated to the plaintiff corporation, began importing
VIVITAR equipment without plaintiff's consent, 68 and plaintiff sued
to clarify the legal effects of regulation 133.21 in light of section 526.
Under a literal reading of section 526, the unauthorized imports
could not enter the United States. Applying the exceptions to section 526 as found in section 133.21, however, the unauthorized imports could be admitted because the VIVITAR trademark was
applied to articles of foreign manufacture under authorization of the
U.S. trademark owner. 69
The CIT determined that Congress enacted section 526 in response to the Second Circuit's holding in Katzel, and limited the
scope of the section to the facts of that case. 70 After an exhaustive
examination of the legislative history, the CIT concluded that section
526 was inapplicable when the U.S. trademark holder was related to
the foreign manufacturing company, and that section 133.21 was
consistent with congressional intent. 7 ' Noting that Congress had debated amending section 526 to prohibit importation of all goods
bearing a U.S. registered trademark, 72 the CIT determined that Congress had specifically considered expanding the protection of section
526, but refused to do so. As a result, the court surmised that Con73
gress had intended to limit section 526 to facts similar to Katzel.
Further proof of intent not to expand the scope of section 526 was
inferred from the fact that Congress amended the statute in 1978
without broadening the section to offer protection to U.S. trademark
holders related to the foreign manufacturer of the goods. 74 The CIT
concluded that Congress considered section 32(1) of the Lanham
66 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 425.
67 See id. at 422-23.
68 See id.

69 See id. at 423; see also 19 U.S.C. § 526 (1982); 19 C.F.R. § 133.21(c)(3) (1985).
70 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 426 (citing Coty, Inc. v. LeBlume Import Co., 292 F.
264, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1923), aft'd, 293 F. 344 (2d Cir. 1923)). Shortly after § 526 was enacted, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit in Katzel. See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at
428. Cf Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1175 (dicta supporting statutory language).
71 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 425-28, 432-33.
72 The amendment purportedly was intended to compel U.S. producers to manufacture domestically. See id. at 428 & n.12 (citing 71 CONG. REc. 3871 (1929)).
73 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 428 & n.12, 435.
74 Customs Procedure Reform and Simplification Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-410,
92 Stat. 888, 903 (1978) (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), (d), (e) (1982)).

a discussion of the amendments see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 433.
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Act and U.S. common law adequate protection from unfair
75
competition.
On appeal, the CAFC affirmed the CIT holding on narrower
grounds. 76 The court framed the issue as whether the American
VIVITAR trademark holder could force Customs to exclude unauthorized imports of VIVITAR products as a matter of statutory
right. 77 Examination of the legislative history of section 526 and relevant cases led the court to conclude that section 133.21s limitations
could not be read into section 52678 because Congress neither limited section 526 in the manner of the Customs regulation, nor gave
Customs legislative authority to affect the scope of section 526. 7 9
Therefore, the court held that section 133.21 does not limit a trademark holder's rights under the statute, but "define[s] Customs' role
in initiating administrative enforcement of the statute." 80 The court
concluded that Vivitar and similarly situated plaintiffs can seek judicial remedies such as injunctions against unauthorized imports or
damages, but cannot compel automatic exclusion of unauthorized
grey market goods.8 1 In short, section 133.21 was held to be a reasonable exercise of Customs' authority, and specific grey market dis82
putes were deemed best left to case-by-case judicial resolution.
In Coalition to Preserve the Integrity of American Trademarks v. United

States, Customs' interpretation of section 526 and Customs regulation 133.21 were again challenged in the District Court for the District of Columbia. 8 3 Plaintiff, a coalition of trademark owners,
sought to exclude genuine grey market goods under section 42 of
the Lanham Act 84 and section 526 of the 1930 Tariff Act. In analyzing the Katzel decision, the court determined that its exclusion of
genuine imports was warranted only when U.S. trademark owners'
rights are totally independent from the foreign manufacturer, and
the U.S. trademark owner has become "the complete master of the
trademark in the U.S. [because] the public recognize[s] the American
purchaser as the sole source of goods in the U.S." '85 The court con-

cluded that Katzel was decided on its equities because the Supreme
Court considered it unfair to allow a foreign manufacturer to sell
exclusive U.S. rights to the plaintiff and subsequently establish a
75 See Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 453.

76 See id., 761 F.2d at 1569.
77 See id. at 1556.

78 See id. at 1561-65. Moreover, Customs' reading of § 526 has been inconsistent.
The Vivitar court noted that the Customs Service had taken a contrary position in Bell &
Howell, 548 F. Supp. at 1063. See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1568.
79 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1569.
80 Id.

81 See id. at 1569-70.
82 See id at 1555.
83 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 884.
84 See id. at 846; see also supra note 9.
85 Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 848.
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competing U.S. distributor. 86 Therefore, the court held that section
42 of the Lanham Act only applies when goods copy or simulate genuine marks and that genuine goods do not copy or simulate absent a
Katzel-type situation. 8 7 Goods manufactured abroad by subsidiaries
of the U.S. companies under a trademark registered in the United
States, thus are not Lanham Act copies or simulations under Coalition
and may be imported without the U.S. trademark holder's consent.
C.

The U.S. International Trade Commission: The Duracell Case

The Duracell case, In Re Certain Alkaline Batteries, represents the
first attempt by a U.S. MNE to protect its U.S. market by employing
the territoriality principle, sections 32(1) and 42 of the Lanham Act,
and section 526 of the Tariff Act to demonstrate a violation of section 337 of the Tariff Act. Section 337, administered by the U.S.
ITC, prohibits unfair importation acts, including trademark, patent,
and copyright infringement, which may substantially injure domestic

industry. 88
Duracell brought suit under section 33789 after other U.S. com-

panies began importing batteries produced by its wholly-owned Belgian 90 subsidiary without authorization. 9' The administrative law
86 See id.

87 See id. at 848. The court found that § 42 of the Lanham Act applied to genuine
goods only in Katzel-type situations, implying that goods manufactured by these parties'
foreign subsidiaries are not counterfeits despite the territoriality principle. This undermines the International Trade Commission's analysis in Duracell. See infra notes 86-101
and accompanying text. See also El Greco Leather Prods. v. Shoe World, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
1380 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (retailer's sale of shoes purchased from authorized foreign manufacturer did not infringe). Cf Monte Carlo Shirts, 707 F.2d at 1054 (defendant manufacturer
did not infringe plaintiff's trademark when it sold to retailer "genuine" shirts for which
plaintiff had contracted, but later rejected because of late delivery).
88 See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1982). Cases, called investigations, first are heard by an administrative law judge (ALJ), who issues an Initial Determination. The Commissioners
then review or adopt the ALJ's determination. If the ITC finds that all the statutory criteria have been met, it can issue an order excluding the imports from the U.S. market.
Under § 1337, the President may disapprove such an exclusion order within 60 days. Id.
§ 1337(g)(2); see also 19 C.F.R. § 210.1-210.71 (1985).
89 Duracell's pursuit of a § 337 remedy rather than a civil action in federal court was
reasonable because the requisite elements of a § 337 violation existed. Territoriality-principle analysis indicated that there was an unfair act of trademark infringement; an efficiently operated domestic industry was injured and there was a high level of imports.
Under § 33 7 (g) the President can disapprove a Commission determination, as happened
in Duracell. Presidential disapprovals are based on often unpredictable policy grounds. See
19 U.S.C. § 1337(g). A civil suit for damages or an injunction would not have offered as
complete a remedy as ITC action. Unlike civil action, an ITC exclusion order would cover
all imports, including those brought in by importers who were not parties tothe litigation.
Duracell thus could avoid filing multiple suits. See In re Orion Co., 21 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 563,
571 (Ct. of Customs and Pat. Appeals 1934).
!) Duracell, Inc., a Delaware corporation, heads Duracell's corporate structure.
Duracell U.S.A. is an unincorporated division of Duracell, Inc. Duracell Belgium, N.V.
Duracell, S.A., is a wholly owned subsidiary of Duracell, International, which is in turn a
subsidiary of Duracell, Inc., the U.S. corporation. Duracell International owns the Belgian
registration of the Duracell trademark. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 825.
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judge (ALJ) made his initial determination (ID) in July 1984, finding
that the Belgian Duracell importers had engaged in unfair importation, as proscribed in section 337, by violating sections 32(1) and 42
of the Lanham Act. 9 2 In determining that defendants had violated

the territoriality principle incorporated in section 42, the ALJ held
that Duracell's trademark has a separate existence under U.S. laws,
the trademark represents local goodwill of Duracell U.S.A., and the
use of the trademark in the United States is not separated from the
goodwill of the business it identifies. 9 3 The ALJ concluded that grey
market importers had violated section 32(1) because there was a substantial likelihood that consumers
would be confused about the
94
source of the Belgian Duracells.
The Commission largely upheld the ALJ's determination, finding violations of section 337 on six grounds. 95 The ITC affirmed the
ALJ's holding that the territoriality principle was incorporated in section 42 and determined that importation of genuine Belgian
96
Duracells infringed Duracell U.S.A.'s exclusive trademark rights.
Because the right to exclude others from using a trademark is implicit in an exclusive right to that mark, 9 7 the Commission concluded
that the territoriality principle protects domestic mark holders from
competition with genuine grey market importers who misappropri91 See id. at 824. In the early 1980s the U.S. dollar rose considerably against most
European currencies, including the Belgian franc. U.S. importers began importing Belgian-made Duracells. While U.S. retailers could sell the imported Duracells at the same
price as domestic Duracells, they could purchase them at roughly one half the wholesale
price. See id. at 826. By 1983 Duracell U.S.A. had lost substantial sales to the unauthorized imports, estimating that it lost millions of dollars during 1983 in its New York sales
district alone. See id. at 838.
Respondents and parties filing amicus briefs included an array of importers, a major
retail chain, trade associations, the U.S. Customs Service, and U.S. owners of foreign
trademarks. Party respondent was a major importer of Duracell batteries. K-Mart was
allowed to intervene as a non-party and filed a post-hearing brief on the grey market issues. On review at the Commission, the case was designated more complicated, thus giving parties greater response time. The list of amici curiae included the Association of
General Merchandise Chains, Inc., COPIAT, 47th St. Photo, Inc., and the Vivitar Corporation. See id. at 825.
112 See id. at 826, 837.

93 See Initial Determination ofJudge Duvall in Duracell, Inv. No. 337-TA-165, at 65-66
(Int'l Trade Comm'n 1984).
504See id. at 67. See also Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 834-37.
95 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 826. The ITC found violations in other areas specific
to the Duracell facts, including misappropriation of trade dress, false designation of origin,
and violations of fair packaging and labeling laws. See id. These violations are not found in
other grey market cases and were peripheral to the Duracell finding of trademark infringement. Vice Chairman liebeler, Commissioners Eckes and Lodwick concurred in the majority opinion; Vice Chairman Liebeler authored the Additional Views, and Chairwoman
Stern and Commissioner Rohr wrote Other Views. The Other Views authors found infringement, but recommended an alternative remedy. See id. at 844; itc'a notes 102-09 and
accompanying text.
96 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 826-32.
97 Id. at 829. Section 33 of the Ianham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1115 (1982) gives a trademark owner an exclusive right to use the mark.
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ate benefits of consumer goodwill that they did not create. 98
Under the Commission's analysis, the trademark was copied,
notwithstanding the fact that the goods were genuine. When sold in
overseas markets, the Duracell mark on Belgian-made batteries was
not a copy of the U.S. trademark. However, once imported into the
United States, the Belgian trademark became a copy or simulation of
the U.S. mark. 99 The ITC also concluded that section 32(1)'s prohibition against imports likely to mislead consumers was violated.
Pointing out that retailers sell domestic and foreign batteries for the
same price,' 0 0 the Commission reasoned that the Belgian Duracells
should be excluded because any disparities in warranty and quality
would not be noticed at time of purchase.' 0 '
Unlike the Coalition and Vivitar courts, the Commission held that
the relationship between a domestic mark holder and a foreign
manufacturer is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether section 42 is violated, as well as whether section 337 of the Tariff Act
has been violated. According to the Commission, the issue is not
whether the parent corporation has been injured, but whether domestic industry has been injured by unfair importation.1 0 2 Indeed,
Vice Chairman Liebler characterized the ITC majority as holding
that "regardless of the corporate relationship between the holder of
a U.S. trademark and a foreign trademark, the U.S. trademark holder
can exclude from the U.S. the identically marked foreign
03
product."1
1.

Alternate Remedies

Although Chairman Stern and Commissioner Rohr agreed that
Duracell's trademark rights were violated, they disagreed with the
98 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 830-31. This is because the purposes of trademark law
include: (1) enabling consumers to identify and distinguish goods; (2) signifying that all
similarly marked goods come from a single source; (3) guaranteeing a level of quality;

(4) assisting in advertising the product; and (5) representing the mark owner's goodwill.
See id. at 829; 1J. MCCARTHY, supra note 20, § 3:1. The ITC also reasoned that the foreign
Duracells would demand a premium, capitalizing on Duracell U.S.A's consumer goodwill
even if they were labeled as of foreign origin, because batteries are an impulse item
purchased primarily on the basis of trademark. See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 839-40.
9 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 833. The Commission relied on a liberal interpretation of "copy" as found in Aldridge, 263 U.S. at 675. Support also was found in Adolf
Coors Co. v. A. Genderson & Sons, Inc., 486 F. Supp. 131, 135 (D. Colo. 1980) (liberal
reading of § 32 of Lanham Act to prevent misappropriation of trademark owner's

goodwill).
loo See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 835.
0 See id.
102 See id. at 838.

14)3 Id. at 843. The Commission confirmed previous rulings limiting § 526 of the Tariff
Act of 1930 to Katzel-type fact situations, holding exclusion under § 526 unavailable. See
id. at 842 (citing Vivilar, 593 F. Supp. at 420). Since the Commission found a violation of
common law trademark rights independent of the Lanham Act, the Customs Department
trademark regulations at 19 C.F.R. § 133.21 were not in issue. See id. at 832.
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majority about the appropriate remedy. Stern and Rohr contended
that exclusion of improperly labeled or misleading imports was a
better remedy than the majority's general exclusion order.10 4 They
contended that labeling goods fairly would remove any unjust advantage enjoyed by importers because consumers would not pay full retail prices for goods imported without the U.S. mark holders'
authorization. 10 5 The price received by unauthorized importers
would, for example, reflect the true value of a Duracell battery made
in Belgium and warranted by the Belgian manufacturer, as determined by informed consumers. Therefore, properly labeled imported batteries would not earn a premium based on the strength of
Duracell U.S.A.'s consumer goodwill.' 0 6 Stern and Rohr also argued
that Duracell's U.S. goodwill would be protected by adequate labeling to inform consumers about the respective warranties of Belgian
and U.S. Duracells and permit them to detect disparities between the
foreign and domestic batteries. 10 7 Finally, the dissenters stressed
that labeling did not disrupt international trade to the same degree
as would an exclusion order.' 0 8
Stern and Rohr also advocated a different application of the territoriality principle. They emphasized that it can be used to determine if two trademarks are similar and cause confusion. Viewed in
this manner, the doctrine of territoriality is relevant only to determine what constitutes a copy or simulation. 10 9 Thus, two identical
marks can embody legally separate rights created by independent
sovereign nations without implying unfairness of the use of one mark
in the country of another. Under this theory, unfairness is predicated on showing confusion and harm to consumer goodwill developed by the trademark owner and territoriality itself may not be
violated. Territoriality merely establishes that genuine goods carry
separate marks that may copy or simulate an identical mark." l0
Therefore, use of a mark is legitimate as long as the public is not
confused and is properly informed about the origin of the good.I"
104 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 845 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
This suggestion is consistent with some of the options developed by the President's working group on intellectual property. See supra note 4.
105 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 858 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
106 See id. "When a mark is used in a way that does not deceive the public we see no
such sanctity in the work as to prevent its being used to tell the truth. It is not taboo."
Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924).
107 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 858 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
108 See id. at 860-61 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr). This position is
more in keeping with international laws concerning trade barriers. See infra notes 149-77
and accompanying text.
l) See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 851 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
110 See id. (citing § 32 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (1982). Chairwoman
Stern interpreted Katzel, 260 U.S. at 639, to permit a finding that even genuine goods are
inlringing. See id. at 849.
111 See id. at 858-59; Prestonelles, 264 U.S. at 359 (use of mark permitted as long as
public is informed correctly; relabeling removed likelihood of confusion). For support of a
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2.

PresidentialDisapproval

While the Commission's Duracell decision presented some
novel applications of the territoriality doctrine, it was short-lived. In
January 1985, President Reagan disapproved the Commission's determination in a memorandum reiterating the Government's position in Vivitar"12 and Coalition113 . The President stated that the ITC
interpretation of section 42 of the Lanham Act was contrary to the
Treasury Department's interpretation.' 1 4 He concluded that approval of the ITC's determination would produce an erroneous impression of official policy before his Administration had formulated
its response to the grey market problem.' 5
III. Antitrust Considerations
Because grey market cases involve market protection and create
price discrepancies, antitrust issues are a recurring feature of grey
market litigation. As is the case with general trade law in this area,
the application of antitrust law to grey market cases presents an ambiguous picture.
In the leading case, United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 1 16 the Government brought suit against U.S. distributors of French perfume. The
distributors were accused of violating sections 2 and 4 of the Sherman Act." 17' The Government contended they had attempted to monopolize importation and sale of foreign-made toiletries by using
section 526 of the Tariff Act to exclude competitive imports. The
Southern District Court for New York held that defendants had violated the antitrust laws.' 18
labeling remedy in grey market cases see Vivitar, 593 F. Supp. at 435; Atwood, Import Restrictions on Trademarked Merchandise--The Role of the U.S. Bureau of Customs, 59 TRADE-MARK
REP. 301, 309 (1969); Dam, Trademarks, Price Discriminationand the Bureau of Customs, 7J. L.
& EcoN. 45 (1964).
The gravamen of trademark infringement is the use of a similar mark likely to cause
confusion. There is no infringement if the likelihood of confusion is eliminated. See
Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 851 (views of Chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr). "[T]he heart
of a successful claim under [the Lanham Act] ... is a showing of likelihood of confusion,

that is, whether an appreciable number of purchasers is likely to be misled as to the source
or sponsorship of defendant's products." El Greco, 599 F. Supp. at 1390.
112 Presidential Disapproval, supra note 5, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862. The Federal Circuit
had not decided Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1552, at this point.
I I Presidential Disapproval, supra note 5, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 862.
114 Id.
It 5 See id.
I1( United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), prob. jurisd noted
sub noai. Ianvin, Parfums, Inc. v. United States, 355 U.S. 951, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 924,
vacated and remanded sub nom., Guerlain, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 915 (1958), dismissed,
172 F. Supp. 107 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) (three actions consolidated for trial). The dismissal was
with prejudice since the Justice Department abandoned the action, leaving defendants unable to prevail or appeal.
117 Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 79.
118 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2 prohibits monopolizing, or attempting to monop-

olize, trade. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982) grants federal courts jurisdiction over § 2 offenses.
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Before the case reached the Supreme Court the Government requested a remand for dismissal, stating that the litigation involved
policy issues best handled by legislation.' '9 The Government anticipated enactment of legislation validating its claim that section 526
did not enable a U.S. company to exclude goods produced by its
foreign affiliate from domestic markets.1 20 The Supreme Court complied with the Government's request for remand, and the district
12 1
court dismissed the Guerlain action.
In 1959 the Cellar Bill, which would have removed import protection for related companies, was proposed. The Cellar Bill called
for repeal of the Tariff Act and revision of section 42 of the Lanham
Act to establish that legitimately marked products manufactured by a
foreign affiliate of a domestic trademark owner could be imported
into the United States. 12 2 The bill's justification was that profits
would eventually go to the controlling corporation and international
enterprise would be encouraged. Although counterfeit marks were
still prohibited, domestic companies could not set prices in the
United States free of competition from products purchased
abroad.' 2 3 The bill was a direct response to restraint of trade practices by MNEs attempting to isolate the U.S. market from international competition 124 and would have removed international
exclusive distribution arrangements from protection provided by
U.S. trademark and tariff laws. The bill never passed. Furthermore,
because Guerlain was dismissed in anticipation of legislation that
never materialized, its precedential value is substantially limited.
However, exclusive distributorships involving MNEs and trademarks
12 5
are not free from antitrust attacks.
Since Continental T. V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. ,126 a rule of reason standard is applied to most vertical restrictions of trade. When a
Guerlain, 155 F. Supp. at 90. The court concluded that defendants had attempted to monopolize, largely because the U.S. company and its French counterpart were a single international enterprise. Id. at 90-91.
119 Motion to vacate and remand to the district court for consideration of motion to
dismiss to be filed by the United States. Guerlain, 358 U.S. at 915. Section 526 should not
be invoked by a U.S. division of a single international company in order to divide its global
market. The relationship between the U.S. trademark holder and the foreign manufacturer is critical. Section 526 does not provide an exception to § 2 of the Sherman Act, and
should not be read in that fashion. See Callmann, ll'orldinarks and the Antitrst Law, II
VAND. L. REV. 515 (1969).
12 ) Brief in support of United States, motion to vacate at 6-7, Guerlain, 358 U.S. 915
(1958). See H.R. REP. No. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959; Atwood, supra note 110, at
307, 313.
121 See Guerlain, 172 F. Supp. at 107.
1'2 H.R. REP. No. 7234, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1959.
123 See Atwood, supra note I 11, at 314.
124

See Vandenburgh, The Problem of Importation of Genninely Marked Goods is not a 7)'ade-

mark Problen, 49 TRADE-MARK REP. 707, 707-08 (1959).
125 Various antitrust remedies may exist in these situations. See Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at

1178.

12(i 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
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,

U.S. trademark holder excludes its subsidiary's legitimately marked
goods from the U.S. market, it controls manufacturing, distribution,
and possible retail of the goods. This may constitute an impermissable vertical restraint of trade when the restraint has unreasonable anti-competitive effects
and, particularly, when the
12 7
arrangement causes price fixing.
When the ALJ applied the rule of reason test in the Duracell case
he found no evidence that Duracell was restricting trade or artificially
inflating U.S. prices.1 28 Although price differences in Duracell batteries did exist between the U.S. and European markets, there was
little evidence indicating that the price differences were not attribu-.
table to exchange rates. 12 9 The ALJ also held that the extensive interbrand competition in the U.S. battery market negated 3 any
0
inference of anti-competitive behavior on the part of Duracell.'
In Parfums Stern v. United States Customs Service the District Court
for the Southern District of Florida concluded that the antitrust laws
did not permit exclusion of grey market goods imported by plaintiff's international affiliates and refused to enjoin importation of
these goods.' 3 1 Plaintiff, a MNE subsidiary that owned the U.S. "Oscar de la Renta" trademark and distributed "Oscar de la Renta"
trademarked goods worldwide, argued that the unauthorized im32
ports of "Oscar de la Renta" goods infringed its trademark rights.'
The court concluded that plaintiff was attempting to insulate itself
from competition with genuine goods marketed internationally by its
own foreign manufacturing sources. 133 Analagous to the Guerlain
court, the Parfums Stern court held that, because of the strong relationship between the domestic trademark owner and the foreign
manufacturer, the plaintiff was trying to monopolize imports of these
34
products.1
According to some commentators, the reasoning of Parfums Stern
reflects antitrust concerns mirrored in Customs Regulation section
133.21.135 Section 133.21's exclusion of related companies from
trademark protection in certain cases has been analyzed as Customs'
attempt to deal with antitrust problems inherent in exclusive distributorships and market division.' 36 This analysis' 37 is supported by
127 See id. at 59. It is a per se violation of § I of the Sherman Act for a manufacturer to
fix the price at which the retailer can sell the product. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407-08 (1911).
128 See Initial Determination of Judge Duvall in Duracell, Inv. No. 337-TA-165 (Int'l
Trade Comm'n 1984).
12) See id.
130

See id.

i'41 575 F. Supp. 416 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
132 See id. at 418-19.
133 See id. at 420.
134 See id.
135

I3

Osawa, 589 F. Supp. at 1177; Atwood, supra note I l1.
See Osawa, 589 F. Snpp. at 1177; Atwood, supra note 111, at 313; supra note 133.
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the adoption of section 133.21 in relation to the Guerlain case.' 3 8 By
use of this regulation, the Customs Service refuses to permit a single
multinational concern to divide its international business goodwill
into national fragments
by the use of exclusive agreements and
39

distributorships. 1
If President Reagan's disapproval of the ITC's Duracell ruling
foreshadows the policy that eventually will be adopted in this area,
Customs regulation 133.21's treatment of section 526 of the Tariff
Act and sections 42 and 32(1) of the Lanham Act probably will prevail. If the Administration follows Customs' lead, companies owning
both the U.S. trademark and the foreign subsidiary manufacturing
the trademarked goods will be prevented from excluding grey market goods because of antitrust law, and the antitrust reasoning exemplified in Parfums Stern will displace that offered by the ALJ in
Duracell.
IV.

National Policy and Grey Market Goods

The profound need for a coherent grey market policy is illustrated by the differing results produced by judicial and administrative reviews of grey market disputes. Although the Vivitar and
Coalition courts sustained Customs' interpretation of section 526 and
permitted the importation of genuine grey market goods produced
by a foreign concern related to the U.S. mark holder, the ITC determined that grey market imports in the Duracell case violated section
40
337 of the Tariff Act. 1
Policymakers in this area will have to consider a number of diverse factors in order to formulate a viable grey market policy.
Trademark law and trademark protection, U.S. trade law, including
questions about the desirability of excluding goods in light of international trade agreements, and possible compromises with protectionist sentiment in Congress must be examined.
A.

Trademark Law

According to one school of thought, importation of genuine unauthorized goods erodes aspects of U.S. trademark law and may negatively affect the public interest. Proponents of this view argue that
businesses will be more likely to invest in adequately protected
trademarks.141 Since trademarks protect consumers by identifying
137 See Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 849-51.

1:8 See id.
1:1.'See Callmann, supra note 119, at 524.
140 See Vivitar, 761 F.2d at 1555; Coalition, 598 F. Supp. at 844; Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at
825. The Reagan Administration's solicitation of information from industry on the efl'ec
of imports underscores the urgency of the grey market problem.
141 Proponents of this view also suggest that U.S. firms would have incentives to develop foreign markets if U.S. trademarks on foreign goods were protected. Such develop-
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goods and their respective quality, this school contends that consumers ultimately will benefit from trademark investment, and that manufacturers may have less incentive to develop quality goods denoted
by trademarks, both at home and abroad, if trademark investments
42
1

are not protected.

In response to these arguments, Kenneth Dam contends that,
although trademarks guarantee the quality of a product, recognition
of this trademark function does not mandate exclusion of genuine
goods in the international trade situation. Dam maintains that general trademark law provides adequate protection when goods are altered or when used goods are sold as new.' 43 Therefore, exclusion is
neither the only nor the most appropriate remedy for maintaining
product quality and protecting trademark holders' goodwill. For example, labeling the unauthorized imports may offer the most viable
solution.
Another commentator also concludes that the grey market import problem should not be resolved by the trademark laws.' 4 4 Vandenburgh compares international trademark use with trademark use
in the U.S. system, noting that a trademark owner licensing a subsidiary to produce trademarked goods in one state could not interfere
with interstate commerce and prevent those goods from entering
other states in the national market. By analogy, he suggests that
goods made abroad under fact situations that would not constitute
trademark infringement if carried out in the United States should not
be excluded under the U.S. trademark laws." 4 5 Vandenburgh concludes that U.S. tariff law, not trademark law, might offer the proper
46
avenue for excluding grey market goods.1
B.

Trade Policy and,Multinational Enterprises

The correct application of the territoriality principle should not
be the sole or overriding issue in the grey market debate. Trade policy lies at the heart of the grey market problem and debate must
center on formulating a coherent policy and assessing its impact on
international trade and domestic markets. 14 7 In formulating a grey
ment would benefit consumers and industry because MNEs would enjoy a greater
economy of scale in advertising costs by using the same trademark internationally. Theo-

retically, U.S. industry also might benefit because the internationally used mark could invite a spillover of goodwill previously established in its native country. Duracell, 225
U.S.P.Q. at 841-44.

142 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q. at 829-30.
143 See Dam, supra note 11l, at 50-51; see also Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 829-30.
144 See Vandenburgh, supra note 123, at 707.
145 See id. at 715; see also Dam, supra note 111, at 57.
146 See Vandenburgh, supra note 124, at 713.
147 See Dam, supra note 111, at 48-49. For example, grey market policy could have a
direct effect on prices charged for protected goods. Were U.S. MNEs able to invoke § 526
of the Tariff Act or provisions of the Lanham Act to exclude genuine goods from the U.S.
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market position, policy makers must consider international trade law
and U.S. relations with its trading partners. International trade law
presumptively favors national trade policies involving minimal distortions of international trade. 14 If the United States created an
exclusionary grey market policy, a whole range of internationally
known trademarked goods could be excluded from the U.S. market.
This sort of policy would involve unacceptable disruptions of international trade because large numbers of goods would be barred entirely from domestic markets."49
An effective policy also must address grey market imports produced by MNEs. Both the specific character of MNEs and their abilities to restrict trade must be considered. Policy makers must balance
perceived ill effects to domestic industry with positive contributions
made by MNE imports.' 5 0 In the case of domestic MNEs, the balance becomes a weighing of the benefits of allowing a domestic company protected by an exclusionary grey market policy to compete
internationally against trade distortions and other problems that
such a policy might create.
C. Examplesfrom the European Economic Community
The European Economic Community (EEC) has faced the grey
market import problem since its birth as an integrated economic region in the late 1950s. From its inception, the EEC has worked towards greater economic integration of Europe through a policy
founded on free trade between EEC member nations. While it may
be argued that the EEC is a sui generis regional arrangement with little
in common with the United States, the goal of free trade between
nations is shared, at least in theory, by the United States and the
European Community. The EEC's treatment of grey market imports
therefore may enhance discussion of this problem in the United
States.
Trademark holders' rights to exclude grey market goods from
national markets are substantially restricted in the European Commarket, the cost of similar goods in the U.S. market would rise. Theoretically, the exclusion would raise domestic prices just as a tariff would. Id. at 45.
148 For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade reduces tariffs but prohibits quantitative restrictions except in certain situations. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, art. XI, 61 Stat. A3, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55
U.N.T.S. 187.
149 See Dam, supra note 111, at 49.
150 SeeJ. DUNNING, INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION AND MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 388
(1981); see also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES OF MULINATIONAL ENTERPRISES:

REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE OF

EXPERTS ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 7 (1977); Davidow, The Seeking of a World

Competition Code: Quixotic Quest?,

COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 381-82 (0.
Schachter & R. Hellawell eds. 1981); Wang, Analysis of Restrictive Business Practices by Transnational Corporations, COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 4-5 (0. Schachter & R. Hellawell eds. 1981).
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mon Market. Underlying this practice is the principle that the EEC
should not be partitioned by exclusive distributorships that often are
based on trademark rights.' 5 1 The EEC's policy supports international trade and economic integration through the free flow of grey
market imports.
To understand development of the European Community's grey
market doctrine, relevant provisions of the treaty creating the EEC
must be discussed. The Treaty of Rome' 52 generally prohibits protectionist laws, including import quotas or national regulations
which would have the same effect as a quota.' 5 3 Article 85 proscribes business practices that affect Community trade and prevent,
restrict, or distort competition in the Common Market. Prohibited
practices include price fixing, production limits, and, importantly,
market allocation. 154

There are exceptions to this general free trade policy. For example, article 36 states that some import controls may be justified
when they are imposed to protect industrial and commercial property' 5 5 unless used to discriminate against or restrict trade between
Member States.' 56 Nonetheless, the article 36 exception does not
limit application of article 85 prohibitions of anti-competitive practices. 15 7 An exclusionary policy may be compatible with article 36
and remain invalid as an infringement of article 85.158 The article 36
exception to EEC free trade principles is construed strictly and lim151 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, FAIR TRADING IN EUROPE 44 (1977).
152 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. II [hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome].
153 See id. arts. 30-34.
154 See id. art. 85. Article 85 provides in pertinent part:
The following practices shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all agreements . . . which are designed to prevent, restrict or
distort competition within the Common Market or which have this effect.
This shall, in particular, include ... direct and indirect price fixing; production, market, technical development or investment controls; market-sharing
or the sharing of supply sources; discriminatory trade practices; and restrictive trade agreements.
Article 85 only concerns agreements between independent commercial entities. It thus
does not apply to agreements between a parent and a subsidiary concerning the allocation
of tasks within the enterprise. The Commission will examine such agreements, however,
to ascertain if they directly or indirectly affect present or future trade. See I THE LAW OF
TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 9.03(2)(a) (V. Nanda ed. 1985) [hereinafter

cited as V. Nanda].
155 Article 36 provides that articles 30-34 shall not preclude prohibitions on imports
justified on grounds including the protection of industrial and commercial property. Such
prohibitions, however, must not constitute trade discrimination or restrictions between
Member States. See Treaty of Rome, supra note 152, art. 36.
156

Id.

157 See Establissements Costen SARL & Grundig-Verkauf-GmbH v. Comm'n EEC,
1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 345, [1966] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8046 at 7654.
For a discussion of Grundig, see V. Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(e).
158 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 77.
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ited to unique circumstances.' 59 Consequently, trademarks receive
limited protection under this article. Although trademarks are protected as industrial and commercial property rights under basic
Community doctrine, the Treaty militates against employing trademarks as a means of trade control between the Member States.
Therefore, it is difficult to exclude grey market imports by use of
160
trademark law within the EEC.
The EEC's grey market policy has been consistently developed
in case law over the last two decades. The anti-competitive articles
of the Treaty and the EEC's ability to deal with grey market imports
were initially tested in Establissements Costen SARL & Grundig-Verkauf
GmbH v. Commission des Communautes Europeenes in 1966.161 The issues
in Grundig arose when third parties began importing genuine
Grundig goods from Germany into France after Grundig, a German
manufacturer, granted exclusive distribution rights in France to
plaintiff. Plaintiff, who had sold the Grundig products in France
under its own "GINT" trademark, brought suit in France alleging
infringement of its trademark. The French court delayed action until
the Commission could hear the case. 16 2 The Commission determined that the absolute territorial protection which Costen sought
was contrary to article 85.163 Therefore, the Commission permitted
the genuine, albeit grey, Grundig articles to enter the French market. 164 The ruling in Grundig prohibits the use of trademarks to exclude grey market imports when the trademark owner and foreign
manufacturer are related enterprises, 65 and invalidates exclusive
distributorship agreements that would provide protection from grey
16 6
market imports in the EEC.
Some years later, in Sirena S. v. Eda GmbH, the Commission fur67
ther restricted use of trademarks to exclude grey market goods.'
159 See S.P.A. Salgoli v. Haitian Ministry for Foreign Trade, 1968 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
453, 463, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 352.56.
160 See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 44-45.

161 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8046.
162 See id. at 304 [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046 at 7672.
A. HERMANN & C. JoNEs, supra note 151, at 73. French law provided then, as it does today,
that exclusive distributors may protect their territory through trademark actions. See
Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 369, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8046 at 7672; A. HERMANN & C.JoNEs, supra note 151, at 73. For present French
law, see text at 32.
163 See generally supra note 154.
164 See Grundig, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 304, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046 at 7621. See also A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 73.
165 An example of a related enterprise is exclusive distributor and manufacturer. See
S. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 45.
16 See id. at 73.

167 See 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 69, 83, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8101 at 7112. See also A. HERMANN & C. JoNEs, supra note 151, at 45; V.
Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(c).
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The case concerned two European companies that had each
purchased exclusive rights to use a U.S. trademark. 168 Sirena had an
exclusive trademark license for Italy, and Eda had a similar license
for Germany.16 9 Sirena brought suit when Eda attempted to sell the
identically trademarked goods in Italy. 170 The Commission denied
Sirena's claim and expanded the scope of its Grundig decision by
holding that trademarks could not be used to isolate national markets from less expensive 7genuine imports even when unrelated enterprises were involved.' '
In a series of decisions in the early 1970s, the Commission clarified the relationship between intellectual property rights and free
trade in the EEC. In Deutsche Grammophone GmbH v. Metro-SB-Grossmarkte GmbH & Co. KG the Commission held that an intellectual
property right owner cannot invoke article 36 when that owner or an
authorized third party sells goods covered by the property right in
another EEC country. 17 2 In Re WEA-Filipacchi Music S.A. the Commission found that a customer agreement violated article 85 because
it established exclusive distributorships by controlling genuine exports.'17 In Van Zuylen Freres v. HagA. G. the Commission limited the
territoriality principle, holding that exclusive trademark owners cannot rely on their national laws to prohibit marketing of genuine
goods originating in the EEC.1 74 Ultimately, the Commission extended this free market policy to non-EEC companies in Re Pittsburgh
Corning Europe, holding that non-EEC parent corporations may not
isolate national markets within the EEC to protect a subsidiary from
lower priced grey market goods.1 7 5 Through these cases, the Com168 See Sirena, 1971 E. Comm. J. Rep. at 80-81, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101 at 711.
169 See id.
170 See id.

171 See id. at 84-85, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8101 at
7113. The Commission suggested that consumer confusion was the only basis for excluding grey market imports, and established a "rule of reason test" to determine if consumers
in fact were misled. See id.
172 See 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 487, 512, [1971-73 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET.
REP. (CCH) 8106 at 7193. See also Treaty of Rome, supra note 152, art. 36; A. HERMANN
& C. JONES, supra note 151, at 78.

173 See 1973 Common Mkt. L.R. D43, D48. See also Centrafarm B.V. and Adriaan de
Peijper v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1975 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246 (plaintiff exhausted intellectual property rights by marketing drugs in England and could not prevent grey market goods from entering Dutch
market). See V. Nanda, supra note 154, § 9.03(2)(e), for discussion of Merck & Co. v. Stephan B.V., [1981] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8707, which substantially supports Celtrafarm; see also HUNNINGS, ANTITRUST CASES FROM COMMON MARKET LAw REPORTS 395
(1976).
174 See 1974 E. Comm. Ct. j. Rep. 731, 755, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8230 at 9133. This case involved a German firm which lost the right to its
Belgian trademark due to wartime expropriation. Its general applicability thus may be
limited. See A. HERMANN & C. JONES, supra note 151, at 45-46.
175 1973 Comm. Mkt. L.R. D2, D7-D8 (E.C. Comm'n-Restr. Practices); see also HUNNINGS, supra note 173, at 384.

N.C.J.

INT'L

L. & COM. REG.

[VOL. II

mission established a free trade doctrine regarding grey market imports that permits few exceptions.
In 1976 the Commission modified its position holding that the
Treaty of Rome did not prevent a trademark owner from excluding
genuine goods. Nonetheless, the Commission held that exclusion of
genuine imports was permissible only if the trademark holder owned
the mark throughout the EEC and if exclusion would not partition or
isolate EEC markets.1 76 The Commission also held that genuine imports creating consumer confusion could be excluded if independent
trademark owners subject to different national laws were 7involved
7
and exclusion would not create artificial market divisions.1
Recent EEC decisions continue to reflect a free market approach
to grey market goods within the Community. Commercial agreements that exclude grey market goods, without attempting to utilize
import controls, have been challenged and voided by the Commission. In one case, an agreement between a manufacturer and its distributors to control grey market goods through discriminatory
warranty and sales services was invalidated under article 85.178 In
addition, the Commission determined that an agreement between a
supplier and distributors which limited grey market trade through
179
export controls violated EEC law.
The EEC has stated firmly that the Community will not tolerate
trade distortions' and anti-competitive pricing produced by an exclusionary policy toward grey market goods. A sampling of other national laws presents a similar picture. German trademarks may not
be used to keep out genuine goods made lawfully abroad when the
German trademark owner has marketed the good abroad, either directly or through an affiliate. In France, doctrine and case law seem
to permit exclusive distributorships when they do not concern essential goods. French law appears to focus on the anti-competitive effects of trademark enforcement, rather than applying a per se rule.
Swedish law allows importation of grey market goods if the domestic
trademark owner and the foreign manufacturer are part of the same
enterprise. In Denmark, trademark law generally does not provide
protection from grey market goods. Finally, grey market goods have
been permitted to enter Japan since the 1970s. Moreover, an open
grey market policy is now officially endorsed by the Japanese Fair
176 See EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Grammofon A/S, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 871,
908, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)

8351 at 7402.

177 See Terrapin (Overseas) Ltd. v. Terranova Industrie C.A. Kapferer & Co., 1976 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1039, 1061-62, (1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8362 at 7605.
178 See Victor Hasselblad, 24 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 161) 18 (1981), [1982-85 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,401.
179 See National Panasonic, 25 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 354) 28 (1982), [1982-85
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT REP. (CCH)

10,441.
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Trade Commission. 18 0
Additional international support for a non-exclusionary grey
market policy is found in the recommendations of a United Nations
study authored by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and
Development. The study recommends a free entry approach for
genuine grey market goods legitimately marked abroad when their
exclusion would result in higher prices or anti-competitive effects.181
D.

U.S. Government Action

The United States is far from realizing a national grey market
policy. 18 2 Congress and the Executive disagree on the contours U.S.
policy should take. Almost a year before the Duracell action was
concluded at the ITC, a number of senators advocated extending
trademark protection to all U.S. companies faced with grey market
imports, regardless of their relationship to the foreign manufacturer.' 83 Protecting consumers, U.S. jobs, and the integrity of U.S.
trademarks are the stated goals of this policy, 184 which would effectively exclude all grey market goods from the U.S. market. In response, the Treasury Department contended that regulation 133.21
prevents a U.S. affiliated MNE from excluding importation of authentic goods sold abroad through section 526. As a compromise,
the Administration proposed changing Customs regulations so that a
U.S. subsidiary of a foreign corporation could protect its exclusive
distributorship of foreign-made goods by registering with the Customs service. 18 5 In short, the Administration indicated that it would
translate Katzel into a regular Customs' procedure, but would not extend protection against grey market goods to the limits proposed by
the senators.
180

See

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, RESTRICTIVE

BUSINESS PRACTICES

RELATING TO TRADEMARKS: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF EXPERTS

ON RESTRICTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 19-35 (1978).
181 See id. at 73-74.
182 See Duracell, 225 U.S.P.Q at 860-62 (view of chairwoman Stern & Comm'r Rohr).
Chairwoman Stern and Commissioner Rohr stated that Duracell presented several new issues relating to the powers of the ITC under § 337 and the use of § 337 to protect U.S.
companies' trademark rights. While § 337 investigations may consider common law and
statutory violations in determining if an unfair act exists, Stern and Rohr doubted that
certain questions of law presented in Duracell rightly could be considered under § 337.
They deemed two sections of the Lanham Act inappropriate for consideration because
Customs regulations provided an adequate procedure and remedy under both sections.
They concluded that these sections were outside the scope of § 337 just as antidumping
and subsidy laws are. See id. at 844-45, 846-47.
183 See Letter from Senators James Abdnor, Bill Bradley, Orrin G. Hatch, Dennis
DeConcini, Alfonse D'Amato, Daniel Moynihan, and Paul Laxalt to Donald Regan, Secretary of the Treasury (Nov. 7, 1983).
184 See id.
185 See Letter from Sec. Donald Regan to Sen. DeConcini (Dec. 23, 1983).
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Conclusion

U.S. policymakers must formulate an effective response to grey
market imports that embraces industrial, international trade, and
consumer concerns, as well as, delineates the protections a U.S.
MNE subsidiary may claim from grey market imports. A number of
factors must be weighed to avoid a blanket exclusion of grey market
goods. An exclusionary policy that creates a trade barrier could
close the U.S. market to a whole range of inexpensive name-brand
goods, creating a series of international and domestic difficulties for
consumers and businesses alike.
Because the grey market problem exists in a period of an inflated dollar and a growing trade deficit, economic pressures may
inflame protectionist sentiments against grey market imports. While
a protectionist policy could allow U.S. corporations like Duracell to
isolate the U.S. market from some international competition, and
preserve domestic industry in its present form, long-term imbalances
in international trade would result. Furthermore, such measures offer expedient, yet ill-conceived, relief from an overvalued dollar,
masking the truly deleterious effects of the high dollar on U.S. and
international economies. By creating an artificial barrier to goods
made cheaper by the overvalued dollar, industry and government
would have less incentive to address the fundamental international
trade problems caused by the dollar's valuation.
An international policy-making perspective involves considering
the broad ramifications of an exclusionary grey market policy. Policy-makers must recognize that competition could be enhanced by
allowing importation of genuine grey market goods. Although such
a policy may temporarily injure domestic trademark holders, the free
186
flow of goods could further global economic development.
It remains to be seen whether the Administration and Congress
can formulate an effective response to grey market goods. Whatever
form the policy eventually takes, it will have to consider trademark
law and international, as well as national, trade ramifications.

186 See Greer, Control of Terms and Conditionsfor International Transfers of Technology to Developing Countries, COMPETITION IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 71-72 (0.

lawell eds. 1981).
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